ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) • DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2017.471 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu degrees, four distinct approaches. 4 In Part IV, this Note argues that the circuit courts have failed to articulate a summary judgment standard that satisfies Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 5 reflects the statutory language of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(e)-2(m) (2012) , and recognizes that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework "is fatally inconsistent with the mixed-motive theory of discrimination." 6 For mixed-motive cases, this Note proposes in Part V that an appropriate summary judgment framework can be articulated by merging and modifying the Fourth and Fifth Circuits' standards 7 with the framework adopted by the Sixth 8 and the Eleventh 9 Circuits. Ultimately, this Note proposes the adoption of the following standard: in a mixed-motive case, a plaintiff may survive a motion for summary judgment by presenting direct or circumstantial evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether: (1) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and (2) race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for the defendant's adverse employment action. 5 FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (providing that a motion for summary judgment should be granted if "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law"); see also Christopher J. Emden 6 Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1237 (discussing Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)); see infra Part IV. 7 See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that a plaintiff may survive summary judgment by using the traditional McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis or, "present[] direct or circumstantial evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an impermissible factor such as race motivated the employer's adverse employment decision" (citations omitted)); see also Emden, supra note 5, at 166 ("This language tracks the language of Rule 56, which says that a motion for summary judgment will be granted when there is 'no genuine issue as to any material fact.'"). 8 See White v. Baxter Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 400 (6th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(e)-2(m) (2012)) ("We . . . hold that to survive a defendant's motion for summary judgment, a Title VII plaintiff asserting a mixed-motive claim need only produce evidence sufficient to convince a jury that:
(1) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and (2) 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor' for the defendant's adverse employment action."). 9 Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1232 ("We conclude that the proper framework for examining mixed-motive claims based on circumstantial evidence is the approach adopted by the Sixth Circuit . . .-not the McDonnell Douglas framework."). 10 See infra Part V. 
II. TITLE VII AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL DISPARATE TREATMENT CLAIM
After a year of debate, 11 Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of an individual's "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 12 According to the Supreme Court, Congress intended the Act to remove "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary, barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 13 Individual disparate treatment claims "are traditionally categorized as either single-motive claims, i.e., where an illegitimate reason motivated an employment decision, or mixed-motive claims, i.e., where both legitimate and illegitimate reasons motivated the employer's decision."
14 To succeed on a mixed-motive claim, an employee must show "that illegal bias, such as bias based on sex or gender, 'was a motivating factor for' an adverse employment action, 'even though other factors also motivated' the action." 15 However, "single-motive claims-which are pretext claims-require a showing that bias was the true reason for the adverse action." 16 
A. McDonnell Douglas, Burdine and the Single Motive Framework
To understand the division among the circuit courts over the proper summary judgment standard in mixed-motive cases, an analysis of the formative Supreme 11 CHARLES W. WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 237 (1985) (dubbing the period leading to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as "the longest debate"); see also Emden, supra note 5, at 142 ("On July 2, 1964, after twelve months of work and a debate dubbed 'the longest debate,' Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964.").
12 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(a)(2) (2012) ("It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or nation origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."). The McDonnell Douglas Court established a three-part burden-shifting framework to resolve the "notable lack of harmony" between "Courts of Appeals" and "to state the applicable rules as to burden of proof and how this shifts upon the making of a prima facie case." 20 To satisfy the McDonnell Douglas framework, an employee must first establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination. 21 As articulated by the Court:
This may be done by showing (i) that [the employee] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that [the employee] applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite [the employee's] qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after [the employee's] rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
22
After the employee has established a prima facie case, the burden of production then shifts to the employer to articulate "some legitimate, non discriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." 23 If that prong is satisfied, the burden of production then shifts back to the employee "to show that [ T] he complainant below, charges that he was denied employment 'because of his involvement in civil rights activities' and 'because of his race and color.' Petitioner denied discrimination of any kind, asserting that its failure to re-employ respondent was based upon and justified by his participation in the unlawful conduct against it."). 20 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801. 21 Id. at 802. 22 Id. 23 Id. 26 Id. at 256. 27 Id. at 253-56. 28 Id. at 253-54. 29 Id. at 256. 30 In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a divided Supreme Court first recognized the existence of the mixed-motive theory of intentional discrimination. 41 The trial judge found that the employer based its adverse employment actions on both legitimate and illegitimate criteria 42 -which is analytically distinct from the single-motive cases previously brought before the Supreme Court. 43 The plurality in Price Waterhouse held that if the employee's gender was a motivating factor for an adverse employment action, the employer could only discharge its liability through "an affirmative defense." 42 Id. at 236 ("Judge Gesell found that Price Waterhouse legitimately emphasized interpersonal skills in its partnership decisions, and also found that the firm had not fabricated its complaints about Hopkins' interpersonal skills as a pretext for discrimination. Moreover, he concluded, the firm did not give decisive emphasis to such traits only because Hopkins was a woman; although there were male candidates who lacked these skills but who were admitted to partnership, the judge found that these candidates possessed other, positive traits that Hopkins lacked."). 43 In mixed-motive cases, such as Price Waterhouse, both legitimate and illegitimate considerations are actually the basis of the adverse employment action. Cf. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801 (noting that the employee's Compliant "charges that he was denied employment 'because of his involvement in civil rights activities' and 'because of his race and color'"). 44 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246 ("Instead, the employer's burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the factfinder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another."). 
Douglas.'"
47 Under this heightened requirement, only plaintiffs with direct evidence could benefit from the mixed-motive framework. 48 Further,
[b]ecause employers were able to avoid liability in mixed-motive cases by showing that they would have taken the same action despite being motivated by an impermissible reason, Price Waterhouse "allowed employers to escape liability in mixed motive discrimination cases' because 'the legitimate motive served to defeat the plaintiff's claim."
49

C. A Response to Price Waterhouse-The 1991 Civil Rights Act
At least partly in response to Price Waterhouse, Congress passed the 1991 Civil Rights Act. 50 The Act amended Title VII by adding 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), which codified a modified motivating-factor standard from the one articulated in Price Waterhouse. Now, a plaintiff could establish her claim for individual disparate treatment under a second framework. 51 The Act specifically provides that "an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice."
52 The Act established a limited affirmative defense for employers. 53 As a result, if the employer can establish that it "would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor," the plaintiff's damages are restricted to "declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees; but may not be awarded damages or an order requiring admission, reinstatement, promotion, or payment." 54 This Note proposes that the summary judgment standard articulated by 47 Emden, supra note 5, at 146 (citing Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 118 (2007)). 48 Katz, supra note 47. 49 Emden, supra note 5, at 147 (citing Cassandra A. o survive a defendant's motion for summary judgment, a . . . plaintiff asserting a mixed-motive claim need only produce evidence sufficient to convince a jury that: (1) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and (2) [a protected characteristic] was a motivating factor for the defendant's adverse employment action."); White, 533 F.3d at 400 ("We . . . hold that to survive a defendant's motion for summary judgment, a Title VII plaintiff asserting a mixed-motive claim need only produce evidence sufficient to convince a jury that: (1) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and (2) 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor' for the defendant's adverse employment action." (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012))). 64 This result led to the circuit-split regarding the proper summary judgment analysis of such claims. 65 Part III of this Note will discuss current summary judgment jurisprudence. Part IV of this Note will outline the circuit-split.
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT JURISPRUDENCE IN THE POST-TRILOGY LANDSCAPE
The landscape of summary judgment jurisprudence has evolved since the Supreme Court's articulation of the McDonnell Douglas framework in 1973. 66 "Courts are no longer reluctant to grant summary judgment in cases where 'there exists questions of fact concerning the employer's motive, thereby denying to employment discrimination plaintiffs their day in court historically promised by the American model of litigation.'" 67 To properly assess the correct standard for summary judgment in mixed-motive individual disparate treatment cases, a brief discussion of current summary jurisprudence is required.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a plaintiff or a defendant to move for summary judgment, preventing the case from being heard by a factfinder. 68 Specifically, Rule 56 provides that summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 69 71 the Court addressed whether a court ruling on a summary judgment motion must consider the evidentiary standard when ruling on the motion. 72 In Anderson, the problem was whether the dispute about the material fact of actual malice was "genuine."
73 According to the Court, a dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." 74 The Court ruled that a "judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden."
75 Essentially, courts are now required to evaluate the probative value of each of the party's evidence.
76
The Anderson Court explained that in a case involving a preponderance standard, 77 the judge deciding one of these motions "must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fairminded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented." 78 Thus, the Anderson decision means that "trial courts are obligated to determine not only whether there is a factual dispute, but whether the evidence identified in the summary judgment opposition would satisfy the plaintiff's burden of proof at trial." 81 The Court ruled that "the burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case."
82 At its core, for our purposes, a defendant need only demonstrate that a plaintiff has insufficient evidence to raise a "genuine dispute as to any material fact," 83 requiring the plaintiff to affirmatively show that it exists.
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., the Supreme Court addressed the standard district courts must apply when deciding whether to grant summary judgment in an antitrust conspiracy case. 84 The decision suggests that "issues such as intent and motive may be appropriate for determination by a motion for summary judgment."
85 Broadly read, Matsushita instructs judges to "weigh the evidence and to decide which inference was more reasonable in light of the evidence."
86 Thus, under Matsushita, if there is a question of plausibility on the theory of liability, the nonmoving party is required to provide more evidence to avoid summary judgment.
87
As the Supreme Court has not yet articulated a summary judgment standard for mixed-motive individual disparate treatment cases, the trilogy of summary judgment cases decided in 1986 will certainly shape such a standard. 88 
IV. DISCUSSING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: THE MIXED-MOTIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MESS
The circuit courts of appeals have, to date, developed four varying approaches to a mixed-motive summary judgment standard. 90 Significantly, the circuits have failed to articulate a standard that conforms to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, reflects the statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(m) (2012), and recognizes that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework functions inconsistently with the purpose of the mixed-motive theory of discrimination. An evaluation of the four approaches follows.
A. A Two-Prong Test: The Eleventh Circuit Follows the Sixth Circuit
In White v. Baxter Health Care Corp., an African-American employee brought, inter alia, a mixed-motive claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(m) (2012) alleging that his employer, Baxter Healthcare Corporation, downgraded his performance evaluation. 91 The Sixth Circuit held:
[T]o survive a defendant's motion for summary judgment, a Title VII plaintiff asserting a mixed-motive claim need only produce evidence sufficient to convince a jury that: (1) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the 89 plaintiff; and (2) "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor" for the defendant's adverse employment action.
92
In so holding, the court implicitly adopted a textual approach. 93 The court further stated, "[t]his burden of producing some evidence . . . is not onerous and should preclude sending the case to the jury only where the record is devoid of evidence that could reasonably be construed to support the plaintiff's claim." 94 The White Court expressly rejected the McDonnell Douglas framework in mixed-motive cases regardless of "whether the plaintiff has presented direct or circumstantial evidence." 95 In adopting the two-prong test, the court looked to the purpose of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. 96 The court indicated that " [i] The court also noted that "the prima facie case requirement 'eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for' the adverse employment action, and thus creates a presumption that the adverse employment action was not motivated by legitimate reasons, but rather by a discriminatory animus." 99 The pretext requirement, the court clarified, "is designed to test whether the defendant's allegedly legitimate reason was the real motivation 92 Id. at 400 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(m) (2012)). 93 See id.; see also Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003) ("Our precedents make clear that the starting point for our analysis is the statutory text." (citing Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992))). 94 White, 533 F.3d at 400. 95 Id. generally be difficult to determine at the summary judgment stage' and thus will typically require sending the case to the jury."
106
The Eleventh Circuit, in Quigg v. Thomas County School District, adopted the Sixth Circuit's approach for evaluating mixed-motive claims that rely on circumstantial evidence. 107 The court looked to the "clear incongruity between the McDonnell Douglas framework and mixed-motive claims" 108 and concluded that "McDonnell Douglas is inappropriate for evaluating mixed-motive claims because it is overly burdensome when applied in the mixed-motive context."
109 Specifically, the Quigg Court noted that the McDonnell Douglas "framework is fatally inconsistent with the mixed-motive theory of discrimination because the framework is predicated on proof of a single, 'true reason' for an adverse action." 110 The court explained, "an employee can only meet her burden under McDonnell Douglas by showing the employer's purported legitimate reasons 'never motivated the employer in its employment decisions or because [the reasons] did not do so in a particular case.'" 111 As a result, the court reasoned, "if an employee cannot rebut her employer's proffered reasons for an adverse action but offers evidence demonstrating that the employer also relied on a forbidden consideration, she will not meet her burden." 112 The court held, however, that "this is the exact type of employee that the mixed-motive theory of discrimination is designed to protect[,]"
113 so "it is improper to evaluate such claims at summary judgment." 
118
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment "if the plaintiff has failed to raise a 'genuine issue as to any material fact . . . and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" 119 The White Court's "devoid of evidence" 120 standard falls woefully short of Rule 56. 121 First, to square the White standard with the language of Rule 56, "'devoid of evidence' must be evaluated the same as 'no genuine issue as to any material fact.'" 122 As a result, under the White standard, "if a plaintiff can put forth any evidence that could reasonably be construed to support his claim, he has created a genuine issue of material fact." 116 Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1238. 117 It is unclear whether the Quigg Court adopted the Sixth Circuit's devoid of evidence standard. See Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1239 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) ("[W]e adopt the framework put forth by the Sixth Circuit in White."). Compare Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1239 ("[The White] framework requires a court to ask only whether a plaintiff has offered evidence sufficient to convince a jury that: (1) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and (2) [a protected characteristic] was a motivating factor for the defendant's adverse employment action . . . . In other words, the court must determine whether the 'plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [her protected characteristic] was a motivating factor for [an] adverse employment decision.'" (emphasis in original)), with White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 400 (6th Cir. 2008) ("This burden of producing some evidence in support of a mixed-motive claim is not onerous and should preclude sending the case to the jury only where the record is devoid of evidence that could reasonably be construed to support the plaintiff's claim."). 118 Beiner, supra note 85, at 96 (quoting Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, 103 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1997)). 119 Emden, supra note 5, at 156 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). 120 White, 533 F.3d at 400. 121 Emden, supra note 5, at 156 ("The Baxter court has circumvented Rule 56 with its lower standard by mandating that any evidence will create a genuine issue of material fact."). 122 Id. at 156; Beiner, supra note 85. 123 156 In articulating a mixedmotive summary judgment standard, the Rachid Court held: [T] he plaintiff must still demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant then must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision to terminate the plaintiff; and, if the plaintiff meets the burden of production, the plaintiff must offer evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact either (1) that the defendant's reason is . . . a pretext, or (2) that the defendant's reason while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and another motivating factor is the plaintiff's protected characteristic.
157
Although the Fifth Circuit's summary judgment standard for mixed-motive cases satisfies Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 158 it failed to account for the McDonnell Douglas framework's divergent purpose with respect to a mixedmotive claim.
159
The Tenth Circuit also missed the mark. 160 In Fye v. Oklahoma Corp. Commission, the Court, applying a unique approach, ruled that "the Price Waterhouse framework does not apply, until the plaintiff presents evidence that directly shows that retaliation played a motivating part in the employment decision . . . . 158 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) ("The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."). 159 See supra Part IV(A). 
V. A MIXED-MOTIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT SOLUTION: CHERRY PICKING THE CIRCUIT COURTS FOR RESULTS
The appropriate summary judgment framework for mixed-motive individual disparate treatment claims may be articulated by merging and modifying the Fourth and Fifth Circuits' standards with the framework adopted by the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits. 182 The following standard is proposed: in a mixed-motive case, a plaintiff may survive a motion for summary judgment by presenting direct or circumstantial evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether: (1) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and (2) "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor" 183 for the defendant's adverse employment action. Such a framework reflects the standard imposed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 184 reflects the statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012), 185 and accounts for the "clear incongruity between the McDonnell Douglas framework and mixed-motive claims."
186
VI. CONCLUSION
With the Eleventh Circuit 187 joining the Sixth Circuit, the federal courts are squarely divided over the appropriate summary judgment standard in individual disparate treatment mixed-motive cases based on circumstantial evidence. At the moment, 188 the circuits have adopted, in varying degrees, four distinct approaches.
189
The circuit courts have failed to articulate a summary judgment standard which satisfies Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 190 reflects the statutory
